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Blockchain-Based Insurance
Michael Abramowicz*

To date, the insurance industry's interest in the blockchain has focused largely on
the possibility of recording insurance entitlements in a transparent way. While the
blockchain may produce significant efficiencies of this sort, it has considerably
greater transformative potential. Smart contracts could serve as a substitute for
insurance companies, conventionally conceived. Such contracts could perform the
function of deciding whether claims should paid, without the need for or possibility
of judicial intervention. The blockchain and smart contracts are difficult to
regulate, because ownership and decisionmaking can be decentralized.
Blockchain-based insurance may successfully provide a means of avoiding
expensive regulation and could have a competitive advantage over regulated
insurance. This article will discuss how blockchain-based insurance might work
and will identify some technical challenges and other obstacles that it may face.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Insurance is a mechanism for pooling risk. Today, insurance companies are
integral to various aspects of risk pooling: They draft, price, and sell policies, and
they handle claims. But are insurance companies necessary to the insurance
function? This chapter will argue that they are not, and moreover that the
blockchain could enable a disruption of the insurance industry. 1 With a
cryptocurrency supporting smart contracts, insureds could pool their resources by
digitally agreeing that their cryptocurrency funds will be governed by a protocol.
The smart contract would specify the insurable interest—perhaps a particular piece
of property or a life—as well as the insurance term, providing a link to documents
providing more information. If an insured later claimed a loss, the insurance claim
would be resolved pursuant to protocols specified in the smart contract. These
protocols ultimately would determine how all the pooled resources would be
allocated among the various contributors to the pool (or their beneficiaries) and
investors.
The obstacles to blockchain-based insurance are many, but the objections
may be grouped crudely in two: first, that insurance companies perform many
functions beyond risk pooling and claim resolution; and second, that a blockchain
with smart contracts would not be able to perform even these functions effectively.
Insurance companies are indeed complex entities. Much of the complexity,
however, results from the need to function in a complex legal environment.
Insurance companies must comply with detailed legal regimes governing
1

This Article builds on a prior work exploring the possibility of cryptocurrency-based insurance.
See Michael Abramowicz, Cryptoinsurance, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (2015).
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insurance—not to mention other areas of law, such as antitrust and employment.
An insurance company must be prepared to defend denials of claims in court, and
litigation is expensive. Moreover, an insurer must draft contracts with due attention
to the possibility of eventual adjudication, recognizing the legal principle that
ambiguities in insurance policies will be resolved against the insurer,2 as well as the
practical reality that juries do not much like insurance companies.3
It is precisely the cost of this legal complexity that creates the possibility
for industry disruption. It would not be easy for the government to regulate
insurance purchased via a smart contract. The fundamental problem is that if there
is no insurer, the traditional target of regulation is missing. Thus, a government
intent on preserving traditional forms of regulation of insurance, including the
adjudicative process, would need to target individuals or businesses purchasing
insurance on the blockchain, rather than insurers. If the government is not willing
to do so, blockchain-based insurance will have a competitive advantage over
traditionally provided insurance, namely that it does not need to follow the law.
This advantage may exist where regulation prevents insurance from being priced at
an actuarially fair rate, for example because of cross-subsidies or because the law
requires certain types of coverage that insureds might otherwise prefer not to
purchase.4 More subtly, blockchain-based insurance may avoid the necessity and
thus the expense of traditional adjudication or arbitration.
This observation leads naturally to the second objection, that the blockchain
is incapable of substituting for the functions that insurance companies perform.
Indeed, it strengthens that objection, because for blockchain-based insurance to be
successful, the blockchain will need to substitute not only for insurance companies,
but also for the legal system that gives policyholders the confidence that their
claims will be paid. Indeed, blockchain-based insurance does not seem possible
today. Smart contracts themselves are in their infancy, and existing experiments
have shown susceptibility to hacking.5 Moreover, cryptocurrencies themselves are
highly speculative,6 and the last thing that one looking to limit risk would want is
2

See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
For convincing empirical evidence that juries are more likely to find liability when defendants are
insured, see Alan Calnan, The Insurance Exclusionary Rule Revisited: Are Reports of Its Demise
Exaggerated?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1177, 1203-04 (1991). See also Valuerie P. Hans, The Illusions and
Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998).
4
See infra Part III.A.3.
5
See, e.g., Stan Schroeder, Not Again: Hackers Steal $32 Million Worth of Ethereum, MASHABLE,
July 20, 2017, 2017 WLNR 22084860.
6
There is considerable recent debate about whether Bitcoin is overvalued. See Tyler Cowen, Is
Bitcoin Just a Bubble?, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (blog), Nov. 30, 2017,
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/11/bitcoin-just-bubble.html.
3
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to have one’s risk cushion invested in a volatile asset. These problems might,
however, be overcome with time. Smart contracts will improve with technological
development and formal proofs verifying their properties.7 Nascent
cryptocurrencies include mechanisms making it possible to hold assets
denominated in dollars or other traditional currencies.8 Even if such stability is
impossible in a traditional cryptocurrency, if a single country were to adopt a
cryptocurrency as its national currency, that currency’s status as fiat could establish
sufficient stability for smart contracts.
Even with a hypothetically functioning and stable cryptocurrency with
smart contract capabilities, mimicking the functions of insurance companies and
the legal system will not be straightforward. Perhaps the simplest design would be
to create a pure fund, where all pooled resources will be returned to insureds in
proportion to their realized losses. But even this approach requires a mechanism to
measure those losses and to do so without courts. A pool of contracts could specify
an arbitrator with the power to determine losses.9 The arbitrator might be paid by a
party filing a claim, with the payment proportional to the claim made. If there is
concern that an arbitrator might have a conflict of interest (perhaps the arbitrator
has surreptitiously contributed to the pool), a variety of mechanisms can be used to
limit the power of any one cryptocurrency owner. For example, an appellate system
could be based on relatively simple voting rules,10 or a truly peer-to-peer system
could be used to generate decentralized decisions.11 Individuals would have
incentives to develop reputations as fair arbitrators, since that would make them
more likely to be selected for future insurance pools and thus earn to earn arbitral
fees.
Existing insurance, of course, is more sophisticated than this, not merely
redistributing premiums to insureds but also providing for the possibility that total
claims might be in excess of premiums. Yet many types of insurance, covering
many insureds with losses unlikely to be highly correlated, could work reasonably
well with such a simple scheme. Moreover, it is possible to imagine blockchainbased insurance that would also allow for payouts to be greater or less than
insureds’ contributions. Investors might contribute to the pool as well, performing
7

See, e.g., https://github.com/pirapira/ethereum-formal-verification-overview.
See, e.g., https://bitshares.org.
9
See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION 104 (2016).
10
See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin (vbuterin), Decentralized Court, REDDIT (Apr. 16, 2016),
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4gigyd/decentralized_court/
[https://perma.cc/X9QC-3DRV] (proposing a “decentralized court” “by which a user could ask a
question, expressed in the form of English text, and have a decentralized mechanism ... determine
the answer, and then send a callback and a log to the user who asked the question”)
11
See infra paragraph accompanying note 29.
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a function similar to buyers of catastrophe bonds.12 Then, the smart contract
protocol would need to specify a process for determining what percentage of the
total pool would be awarded to insureds based on their claims. If the level of losses
were unexpectedly high, then the investors might not recover all of the funds they
invested; if they were lower or the same as expected, then investors would recover
their funds, plus some portion of the funds provided by the insureds. A more
elaborate design might allow for reinsurance.
Whether or not the payouts are guaranteed to equal the contributions to the
pool, an insured would be hesitant to contribute to a pool as described so far, if the
insured expected other insureds to be of higher risk. If payouts are simply
proportional to losses, then the pool will be beset by adverse selection, 13 with only
insureds with the highest risk willing to join the pool. Lower-risk parties will either
forego insurance altogether or will opt for traditional insurance, where an insurance
company adjusts premia based on the risk of each insured. Meanwhile, moral
hazard would likely rear its ugly head, if the rules of the insurance pool did not ban
highly risky activities.14 The twin dangers of adverse selection and moral hazard, it
might seem, would doom blockchain-based insurance by preventing it from
performing perhaps the most important function of an insurance company:
underwriting.
There are, however, at least two possible means of making payouts
proportional to risk. The first approach is to change the arbitrator’s assignment.
Instead of measuring only the loss amount, the arbitrator would seek to estimate ex
post the ex ante distribution of various possible loss levels. This would make it
possible to determine the portion of the premium allocated to the loss level realized
and the ex ante probability of that loss. The insured would then be credited with
that portion of the premium multiplied by the ex ante probability. High-risk
insureds would thus receive lower payouts. One can view this system as an ex post
alternative to underwriting. Meanwhile, some insureds might exclude coverage for
high-risk activities or find other means of committing to being low risk (such as
installing fire protection devices), thus lowering moral hazard. This is a form of
self-underwriting. The reward for doing so is that if a still-covered loss occurs, the
arbitrator will conclude that the losses were lower probability and thus the payouts
were higher.
The second approach to taking into account insureds’ various risk profiles
would be for blockchain-based insurance could develop a system of underwriting,
thus making it more akin to existing forms of insurance. This system might piggy12

See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on
Damages, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 764-66 (2007) (describing market for such bonds).
13
See George A. Akeriof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (providing the canonical explanation of the problem).
14
See generally 44 AM. JUR. 2D INSURANCE § 1198.
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back on existing insurance contracts, or alternative form contracts might be
developed. Either way, a decentralized system of assessing the risk of a potential
insured would be needed. For example, some third parties might specialize in
certifying insureds for a fee. Investors would then take into account the reputation
of these third parties in determining whether to cover some portion of the risk for
an insured. The arrangement would thus be similar to that provided by Lloyds of
London.15 Algorithmically, this is not much more complex to implement than the
approach above. It insists on taking risk into account ex ante rather than ex post,
thus providing greater predictability but at larger transactions costs. The principal
challenge with this approach is that it could take longer to develop, as investors
would only gradually be able to learn which third parties’ evaluations to trust.
If blockchain-based insurance can overcome obstacles such as
cryptocurrency instability to gain a foothold in the market, however, one virtue of
the blockchain is that information on transactions would be publicly available. A
critical function of insurance companies today is to provide actuarial expertise,
based largely on proprietary data. If the blockchain makes publicly available all
contracts, along with third-party certifications and ex post adjudications, then
relevant data will be shared. Data, of course, must be analyzed. Possibly, such
analysis will take the form of open-source code. Alternatively, market participants
like certifiers and investors may independently analyze the data, obtaining a
competitive advantage to the extent that their trade secret models are more accurate
than their competitors’. Either way, potential insureds would be in a much better
position to evaluate potential insurance contracts. The large expenditures of
insurance companies on advertising, much of it largely uninformative, likely
reflects the difficulty today that consumers have in evaluating potential insurers.
With blockchain insurance, there are no insurance companies, but there might be
other market participants whose credibility is at issue. Open data might allow for
the creation of metrics to inform questions such as how commonly arbitrators are
overturned on appeal and how much reinsurance counterparties have.
Prognosticating future market developments is always risky, and I do not
mean to imply that blockchain-based insurance will necessarily upend the insurance
industry as conventionally understood or even that it will earn substantial market
share. Indeed, this chapter will identify significant obstacles to such insurance, and
although these obstacles could be overcome, it is difficult to guess whether that
might happen in a decade or even in fifty years. Even once the obstacles are gone,
private ordering can take a long time. There are strong network benefits to existing
insurance, and blockchain-based insurance would for the most part need to be built
from the ground up. Finally, even if blockchain-based insurance is developed, it is
15

See generally BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 231:62 (discussing the Lloyds of London
marketplace).

BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INSURANCE

7

not clear what precise form such insurance would take—for example, whether the
total amount of premiums to be returned to insureds will be set in advance.
The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve such questions, but rather
simply to sketch out some ways that blockchain-based insurance might work—to
establish a proof of concept rather than a prediction. This sketch, much of which
has already been accomplished in this introduction, is needed to support this
chapter’s observations about how law might affect blockchain-based insurance. As
suggested above, existing regulation of insurance carriers may boost blockchainbased insurance, because some forms of blockchain-based insurance may be
beyond the reach of regulators, in much the same way as municipal regulation of
taxi drivers allegedly helped ride-sharing services such as Uber.16 On the other
hand, this perspective may underestimate the willingness of lawmakers to regulate
blockchain-based insurance, for example by targeting purchasers, or to provide
advantages like tax deductibility to providers of traditional insurance. Meanwhile,
a foreign legal system could significantly boost the prospects of blockchain-based
insurance by creating a fiat cryptocurrency or alternatively by creating a regulatory
framework making it possible for premiums to be invested in real assets during the
life of insurance contracts.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Part II describes how blockchain-based
insurance might work, first identifying a limited role for the blockchain with
traditional insurers and then expanding on this introduction’s sketch of how the
blockchain might facilitate insurance disintermediation—that is, the pooling of risk
without insurance companies as conventionally conceived. Part III then documents
how the legal system can make insurance expensive, thus providing a market
opportunity for a new, unregulated product, and identifies legal obstacles to
blockchain-based insurance.
II. HOW BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INSURANCE WOULD WORK

A recent report by McKinsey & Co. is titled Blockchain-in-Insurance:
Opportunity or Threat?.17 The report’s discussion of the “threat” is limited to a
single sentence: “As an innovative technology, blockchain presents a threat for
incumbents in the form of innovative business models and/or cost advantages.”18
The report, however, does not elaborate what these “innovative business models”
might be, focusing instead on potential benefits of the blockchain to incumbent
insurance policies. An Ernst & Young report on blockchain-based insurance takes
16

See, e.g., Katherine E. O’Connor, Along for the Ride: Regulating Transportation Network
Companies, 51 TULSA L. REV. 579, 582 (2016).
17
MCKINSEY & CO., BLOCKCHAIN-IN-INSURANCE: OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT? (July 2016).
18
Id. at 7.
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a similar approach.19 Perhaps the assumption is that incumbent insurance
companies will be as well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities offered
by the blockchain in insurance as upstarts. These “opportunities,” however, signal
the possibility for broader disruptions than the reports acknowledge.
A. With Traditional Insurers
The McKinsey report suggests that the blockchain may provide a
mechanism for customers to provide data to insurance and other companies without
being subject to endless entry screens and need for verification. The report
describes technology allowing a “customer [to] grant[] a company access to identity
data when necessary for a contract closure.”20 While this may seem relatively
trivial, the report is correct to highlight it, because the easier it is for customers to
share their information, the more likely customers will be to compare different
companies’ insurance products. But even if insurance companies can obtain
customer information more easily, a significant explanation of customer loyalty lies
in the difficulty of comparing insurance products. We will see below, however, that
a public blockchain may make it easier for customers to determine which insurance
product is likely to provide it with the best risk protection.21
The McKinsey report specifically identifies “smart contracts on top of a
blockchain” as offering various benefits, such as “automation of claims handling”
and providing “a reliable and transparent payout mechanism for the customer.” 22
But, barring rare instances of checks lost in the mail, customers already know when
insurance companies make payouts to them, and the use of permissioned
blockchains will not guarantee faster delivery to the customer. The report notes that
“a smart contract can ensure that the claim is only paid out if the car is repaired in
a garage preferred and pre-defined by the insurer,”23 but insurance companies can
easily enforce such restrictions absent smart contracts. The greater potential for
smart contracts is that they might provide greater assurance to the customer that the
insurance company will make appropriate payments when claims arise. But this
will occur only if smart contracts change the process for resolving claims in a
fundamental way, for example by allowing a third-party arbitrator to determine
whether to honor claims.

19

ERNST & YOUNG, BLOCKCHAIN IN INSURANCE: APPLICATIONS AND PURSUING A PATH TO
ADOPTION (2017).
20
Id. at 3.
21
See infra Part II.B.3.
22
MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 17, at 4.
23
Id.
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The report also notes that the blockchain might reduce fraudulent
transactions, by allowing for validation of documents, such as customer medical
reports, and “detect[ing] patterns of fraudulent behavior related to a specific
identity.”24 But as the report notes, such benefits require “intensive cooperation
between insurers, manufacturers, customers, and other parties.”25 Insurance
companies might not have sufficient incentive to share data, particularly if their
data provides them a competitive advantage. But upstart competitors relying solely
on the blockchain would need to be transparent almost by necessity. If the
transparency of blockchain-based insurance deters customers from engaging in
fraud (perhaps those customers will continue to work with traditional insurers),
blockchain-based insurance might gain a significant advantage over those insurers.
Meanwhile, the report notes that reinsurance may be more feasible if insurance
transactions are represented on the blockchain,26 but this too suggests that a form
of competition featuring transparency may have some long-term advantages over
existing proprietary competition.
B. Without Traditional Insurers
Neither the McKinsey nor the Ernst & Young report considers the
possibility that smart contracts might facilitate the development of an unregulated
form of insurance. The legal system has long played a critical role in the insurance
market. It is possible to imagine a world in which companies like
telecommunications providers could furnish services even if the contracts they
entered into with customers were not legally enforceable,27 as customers would
recognize the reputational incentives that such providers would have to furnish
services. But this seems far less plausible in the insurance context. Though
relatively few insureds end up in coverage litigation with their insurance
companies, the possibility of such litigation has a substantial disciplining effect. It
assures customers that insurance companies will not simply walk off with their
premiums if they determine that the funds being held for consumers exceed the
present discounted value of profits from honest insurance provision. Smart
24

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5.
26
Id. at 6. Similarly, the Ernst & Young report notes that “P&C insurers seeking clearer visibility
into their reinsurance contracts and risk exposures may gain it through blockchain.” ERNST &
YOUNG, supra note 19, at 4.
27
For an argument that contracts sometimes can be self-enforcing, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). Given that
consumers generally do not read contracts, the mandated disclosure of contract terms may produce
relatively little consumer benefit. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
25
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contracts, however, provide an alternative form of guarantee to customers that no
one will breach their promise walk off with their funds. They can thus serve as an
alternative to the legal system, including regulation and adjudication.
Indeed, with the pure insurance pool model, insureds need not trust one
another, so long as the smart contract provides assurance that total payouts will be
equal to premiums. There is no party that has the ability with such an arrangement
to take the premiums and run, assuming that the smart contracts cannot be exploited
by hackers. It is this advantage that makes this type of blockchain-based insurance
coverage more likely to develop initially than a full-blown substitute for the
existing insurance system. But a pooling approach has its own challenges, as
insureds must still be convinced that other contributors to the pool will not have
some inherent advantage over them in claiming the funds ex post. Insureds must
thus have some ability to trust an arbitrator, but we will see that careful design can
limit the power of any single arbitrator and thus facilitate a pooling arrangement.
Trustworthy adjudication will be even more important if the total size of payouts is
not guaranteed to be equal to the total premiums, especially if a substitute for ex
ante underwriting is used.
1. Pooling Through Smart Contracts
The smart contract insurance pool is straightforward in design. A smart
contract would be produced as a form of open source software code. To purchase
insurance, an individual or entity would digitally sign the smart contract. The smart
contract would include virtual blanks for two important pieces of information. The
first is the amount of cryptocurrency being contributed to the contract (which might
be constrained by the smart contract to being within some range, to avoid both
frivolously low coverage amounts and coverage amounts so high as to increase risk
to other members of the pool). The smart contract might be considered incomplete
until this money is paid, or the contract could be designed so that a specific premium
is required, with the contract ceasing to be operational if a premium payment is not
later made. The second type of information concerns the insurable interest. The
simplest form this might take is a hash code uniquely identifying a document
created by the insured and made publicly available that provides information about
the interest insured. Insureds might fill out open source forms that solicit relevant
questions about the insurable interest. Critically, placing the hash on a reliable
blockchain using a suitably robust protocol such as proof of work makes it virtually
impossible to change the document after its initial creation.
The smart contract would be governed by its code, but claim arbitrators
would be expected to make their decisions according to contract terms applying to
all insureds using that smart contract. The code for the smart contract might include
a hash of a document containing such terms. (Again, the smart contract code itself
could produce a hash, thus ensuring that the terms cannot be tampered with.) These
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terms might be designed to combat obvious forms of adverse selection. For
example, the terms might provide that no coverage will be available if it turns out
that the insured failed to disclose certain types of information, such as pre-existing
conditions in a health insurance contract. Or, a fire insurance policy might combat
moral hazard by barring coverage if it turned out that the insured failed properly to
maintain smoke detectors. Meanwhile, individual insureds might add their own
coverage restrictions to the contract. By eliminating coverage for some scenarios,
the insured effectively allocates more of the premium to coverage in other
scenarios, thus increasing payouts in those cases.
Specific exclusions, however, are not essential, so long as claim payouts are
based on ex post estimates of ex ante risk. What is essential is that the contract
specify, both with code and with instructions, how claims should be handled. A
simple arrangement would work as follows: An insured with a claim will specify
the maximum amount of the claim. To discourage frivolous and excess claims, the
insured must pay some percentage of this amount (perhaps 5%), but no less than a
specified minimum, to fund the claim arbitrator. The arbitrator’s role will then be
to determine how much of the claim to allow. The arbitrator would do this by
retrospectively allocating the premium across different types and levels of losses.
That is, the arbitrator would estimate the ex ante probability of every type of loss
and level of loss within that type and would then allocate the premium across these
types and levels in the way that ex ante would most reduce risk. That should allow
the arbitrator to determine what portion of the premium should be attributed to a
loss of the type and level experienced. Then, the arbitrator would determine the
type and level of loss actually experienced, multiply by the amount of the premium
allocated to this loss, and divide this by the ex ante probability of the loss. The
lesser of this number and the claim sought can be defined as the verified claim.
Consider the following very simple example. Suppose that an insured
purchases car insurance and specifies no further exclusions. The arbitrator might
determine that there was a 1% chance of a $10,000 loss and a 2% chance of a $5,000
loss. The optimal ex ante insurance premium would then have been $200
(0.01*$10,000 + 0.02*$5,000). If the insured in fact purchased $200 in insurance,
then this insurance would be allocated evenly between the two contingencies, as
this would provide optimal insurance. If the insured only purchased $100 in
insurance, then that $100 would be allocated entirely to insurance against the
chance of the higher loss, as this can be shown to minimize the variance of loss.
For a $150 premium, $100 would be allocated against the $10,000 risk and $50
would be allocated against the $5,000 risk. Of course, in reality there might be many
more levels of loss, as well as possibly losses of different types (say, vehicle
damage and rental costs while the vehicle is being fixed). Still, so long as the
arbitrator can estimate the ex ante probabilities of these events—and in time, the
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transparency of the blockchain should improve an arbitrator’s accuracy in doing
so—it should be straightforward to determine the optimal insurance allocation.
Smart contracts would be paid out all at once, at the conclusion of the policy
period. (An insured would be able to sell the right to a smart contract payment at
an earlier time.) Particularly with early smart contracts, this should also facilitate
making ex ante assessments, as the arbitrator would at least be able to look at data
associated with all contracts and claims. If verified claims exceed the total
premiums, then an insured with a verified claim would receive the verified amount
multiplied by the quotient of total premiums divided by total verified claims. The
smart contract, however, also must address the contingency in which verified
claims are less than total premiums. One possibility is to pay extra on claims. This
may be an appropriate approach if there is a concern that arbitrators may pay too
little on claims. Another possibility is to refund the remaining amount to all
insureds in an amount proportional to their contributions. Mutual insurance
companies often take a similar approach, paying dividends to insureds when claim
payouts are sufficiently low.28 This approach avoids providing a windfall to those
who have verified claims, and it is essential at least if there are no verified claims.
All of this should be straightforward to implement in a smart contract, once
a smart contract platform is suitably developed. Calculating payouts is a matter of
arithmetic that can easily be implemented in a computer algorithm. The hard work
is done by the arbitrators, and the most important function of a smart contract is to
provide a suitable mechanism for selection of an arbitrator. A smart contract might
just select the arbitrator in advance. This can technically be implemented by
including in the smart contract the public key of the arbitrator, who would then use
the corresponding private key to confirm particular awards. The public-private key
pair might be owned by an entity or by an individual. Indeed, this might well be the
entity that constructs and markets the particular smart contract. So long as this
entity is sufficiently trustworthy, insureds should be willing to participate.
There are two possible concerns about such an arrangement, however. First,
particularly if the goal is to avoid legal regulation, it might be desirable for the
arbitrator to be anonymous. This concern may be overstated, however, particularly
since the arbitrator could be based in a friendly jurisdiction like the Cayman Islands,
reviewing evidence submitted electronically. Second, and more seriously, there is
a danger that the arbitrator might engage in fraud, for example by adding one or
more spurious insurance contracts to the pool and then filing false claims that are
then given higher verified values. Over time, such a scheme is likely to be
uncovered. At least, it would be apparent that verified claims for smart contracts
resolved by the arbitrator tended to be high, and this should lead individuals seeking
the best deal to contract with other insurance pool providers. In the long run,
28

See, e.g., https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annual-dividend.asp.
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arbitrators might develop sufficient reputations that would make it more profitable
to arbitrate honestly than to submit false claims. But this could at least create
problems in the short term.
A slightly more complex arrangement would allow for the smart contract
provider to designate a pool of arbitrators, with the arbitrator for any particular
claim selected at random from the pool. A further improvement is to allow one
arbitrator’s judgment to be challenged by an appeal to a second arbitrator. The
insured might be allowed a rehearing if the insured were willing to pay the required
arbitral fee again, or perhaps only if the insured were willing to pay some higher
fee. Meanwhile, a third party might be allowed to pay the same amount to challenge
an initial arbitrator’s ruling as being too large. The right to be that third party might
be auctioned to the third party willing to pay the most (but no less than the arbitral
fee) for the right to receive any decline in the size of the verified claim. Any auction
proceeds in excess of the arbitral fee could be added to the premium pool and thus
distributed among verified claimants. Further refinements could be made. For
example, if an appeal results in a sufficiently different valuation, the initial
arbitrator might forfeit the arbitral fee, or even be required to forfeit a bond. The
point here is not to determine the optimal contract, something that could be worked
out with time, but simply to indicate that relatively simple systems for choosing
and incentivizing arbitrators and creating a form of appellate adjudication could be
devised.
Perhaps the most ambitious approach to arbitration would be one that I
discussed in earlier papers: the use of peer-to-peer adjudication.29 I will not repeat
a full description of peer-to-peer adjudication here, but its most important
characteristic is that no arbitrator need be selected. Instead, anyone would be able
to offer a suggested resolution of the claim. A participant in the resolution process,
however, would be given economic incentives to announce a resolution as close as
possible to any resolution that a subsequent participant in the process might
provide. A participant who announces a valuation closer to the later valuation the
the prior valuation will earn currency, while a participant who pushes the valuation
in one direction only to have the valuation pushed back in the opposite direction
will generally lose currency. Because a participant will not know who might
participate later, the incentive of each participant is to seek out the “focal”
resolution to the question of how large the verified claim should be. The provisions
of the smart contract concerning how claims should be resolved are likely to
determine what participants in this market believe is focal.
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2. Underwriting, Investment, and Reinsurance
Just as one might develop much more complex mechanisms for resolving
claims than the one specified here, so too might one develop more complex
insurance schemes, including insurance schemes where total payouts do not
necessarily equal total premiums paid. One means of accomplishing this would be
for the smart contract sponsor to commit funds to the pool (or to find outside
investors willing to commit funds). Instead of the insureds’ receiving a refund if
total premiums are in excess of verified claims, the smart contract provider would
receive the difference, but the provider could lose some or all of the funds if verified
claims exceed premiums. This approach magnifies the importance of insureds’ trust
in the arbitration process. Insureds may have more faith in that process if the
arbitrators’ responsibility is less open-ended than making ex post assessments of ex
ante probabilities, and so it is likely that once the market moves away from the pool
model, there will be a concomitant tendency for insurance contracts to become
more rule-bound.
An approach of this sort will be essential in any insurance context in which
losses are likely to be highly correlated—for example, property insurance that
includes protection against hazards like hurricanes or earthquakes. A pool approach
might still be viable for insurance of that sort, but the risks would need to be
diversified. Smart contract sponsors, for example, might seek out smart contract
holders from many different locations, to minimize the risk that total claims will
greatly exceed total premiums. But if the adjudicative process were someday to
become sufficiently trusted, then there is no reason that blockchain-based insurance
cannot protect against highly correlated losses in much the same way as regular
insurance. It is also possible to imagine hybrid approaches. For example, the smart
contract provider might place aside funds to be added to the pool only in the event
of some specific contingency, for example a hurricane with damages in a particular
region exceeding some threshold. The smart contract provider might even raise
such funds from third parties looking for high returns, thus creating an investment
vehicle similar to catastrophe bonds.30 With this contingent financing, insureds
might still face some risk that losses might be unexpectedly high as a result of a
statistical blip, but would receive assurance that sufficient funds would be available
in the event of an identifiable catastrophe
Another means of protecting insureds in the event of high losses would be
for some form of blockchain-based reinsurance to emerge. This could be
implemented in smart contracts as well and provide a means for risk pooling to
occur beyond the limits of any particular smart contract. For example, a smart
contract sponsor might provide that some portion of premiums for the smart
30
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contract will be placed aside, with the aggregate invested into a reinsurance smart
contract. That smart contract might itself take the form of an insurance pool, with
payouts made to the smart contracts in the pool with the most unexpectedly high
losses. Of course, just as the insurance industry features tiers of reinsurance, so too
could smart insurance contracts on the blockchain.
It might also be possible for blockchain-based insurance to increase its
credibility by piggybacking on existing legal regimes. For example, a smart
contract sponsor based in the Cayman Islands might wish to use certain real assets
as security for smart contracts in the event that claims are sufficiently high.
Meanwhile, the smart contract might provide for adjudication in a traditional court
or arbitral body to determine whether those real assets must be sold so that the
proceeds can be added to a smart insurance pool. One defect of the smart contract
arrangements described so far is that assets such as premiums are tied up in the
smart currency during the contract period, rather than invested, as would occur with
typical insurance arrangements. But if a single jurisdiction credibly commits to
enforcing contracts related to blockchain-based insurance, regardless of whether
those contracts accord with the insurance law of other jurisdictions, then that
provides a nexus between the cryptocurrency and the broader financial world.
Different jurisdictions might perform different roles—supporting a fiat
cryptocurrency, performing adjudication, recognizing the possibility that a smart
contract may be a beneficial owner of real assets31 and enforcing judgments
accordingly—but a single jurisdiction might determine that it could benefit by
serving as a virtual host for smart contracts, in much the same way as Delaware has
profited from its domination in corporate law charters.
3. Consumer Information
Blockchain-based insurance is nonexistent, and even if it emerges, it will
initially be unfamiliar. Most insurance customers will at first be more comfortable
sticking with established players. Yet the radical transparency of such insurance
makes it plausible that consumers might learn that smart contracts are trustworthy,
and more than that, consumers might be able to determine which smart contracts
are most appropriate for their particular circumstances. The defining differences
between smart contracts will be the code governing them and the instructions for
arbitrators. Media companies like Consumer Reports or the Wall Street Journal
might review such documents and rate these contracts. Over time, more
sophisticated ratings might be developed based on the results of adjudications for
different smart contracts.
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It is also possible that further smart contracts might be developed to provide
guidance to consumers. For example, third parties might contract with insureds to
rate insureds’ likely customer satisfaction with different smart contract providers.
The third parties might be compensated based on the degree to which their
assessments proved accurate, with the compensation formulas depending on the
third parties’ performance across many smart contracts and thus not dependent
solely on the vagaries of any single customer’s experience. Such third parties would
in effect serve a role of insurance brokers, but unlike traditional insurance brokers,
would be paid only to the extent that they provided useful information to consumers
about their likely satisfaction. This would give the third parties some incentive to
determine which smart contracts might be most appropriate for which customers.
In principle, it may be possible for similar institutions to evolve with traditional
insurance, but it is much more straightforward in a world in which customers can
simply be required to assess their satisfaction ex post and these values can
automatically determine brokers’ success.
III. THE LAW’S ROLE IN BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INSURANCE

Parts I and II have described in detail how blockchain-based insurance
might work, but that still leaves the fundamental question of whether blockchainbased insurance has any inherent competitive advantage over ordinary insurance.
The blockchain may well be an overhyped technology. At its core, a blockchain has
no technical advantages over an ordinary database, and indeed the challenges of
scaling blockchain technology may mean that blockchains will often be inferior to
databases.32 If the blockchain is to serve a significant role in the insurance market,
it is likely to be not because the technology is revolutionary as a database
technology, but because a cryptocurrency armed with smart contract capabilities
can escape legal regulation. Indeed, the goal of escaping regulation may well be a
principal motivating factor in some other smart contract projects, such as augur.net,
a decentralized prediction market that can be used for sports gambling.
This section addresses two questions: To what extent does legal regulation
create expenses for traditional insurance carriers that blockchain-based insurance
would not need to bear? And, to what extent could legal regulators successfully
defend the project of insurance regulation by blocking unregulated blockchainbased insurance? This section does not address the broader question of whether
blockchain-based insurance on the whole would improve social welfare. There are
significant benefits to many existing forms of insurance regulation, for example in
protecting consumers from fraud. Just as some investors lost money in insecure
32
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Bitcoin-based banks, there is a danger that investors might lose money as a result
of poorly designed blockchain-based insurance contracts. The ultimate question,
not addressed here, is whether the transparency of the blockchain and smart
contracts could lead to a form of private ordering that is equally or more effective
in providing value to insureds.
A. The Expense of Law
1. Compliance
Smart contract providers might not need to employ lawyers to ensure
compliance with state, national, and international insurance regulation. The
potential savings from direct compliance activities, however, may be small. A
recent survey of property and casualty insurers determined that the insurers’
average corporate and regulatory compliance expenses amounted to 0.19% of
premiums.33 By itself, this is not a sufficiently large amount of money to make a
compelling case for smart contracts. It is quite small relative to expenses overall.
In the first half of 2016, the expense ratio for property-and-casualty insurers in the
United States was 27.7%.34 Of course, without insurance companies, other expenses
contributing to this ratio would also be eliminated. Once the smart contract exists,
all that is needed are willing insureds, arbitrators, and, if applicable, investors who
provide a cushion in the event of high claims. To be sure, arbitrators will demand
compensation. But this suggests that the most relevant savings are not directly from
compliance activities, but from other sources, such as reduced marketing expenses,
reduced costs associated with processing claims, and reduced inefficiencies
resulting from legal compliance that forces insurers to adopt inefficient contracts.
2. Adjudication
There is no inherent guarantee that claims processing will be cheaper with
smart contracts than with traditional blockchain-based insurance. Indeed, a strong
argument against the insurance pool is that every insurance claim will result in some
form of adjudication, as the arbitrator will need to determine ex ante probabilities
of losses and thus allocate premia, in addition to determining whether the claimed
loss occurred. Yet much of this work will likely not be repeated from one arbitration
to another. Especially if there is some form of appellate review, arbitrators will have
some incentive to explain their decisions, and an arbitrator will likely start by
33
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looking at similar past decisions to determine how to allocate ex ante probabilities.
The types of information relevant to determining whether a loss occurred—
photographs, statements from witnesses, and so forth—are likely to be relatively
standardized. So too are the types of information likely to be relevant to assessing
ex ante probabilities, particularly information that shows the level of care that the
defendant was exercising. Just as precedent is valuable in traditional adjudication,
so too might it be used even in an informal system of adjudication on the
blockchain.35
Inevitably, there will be some claims that require arbitrators to exercise
judgment in certain respects, but the informality of the arbitration process should
allow arbitrators to focus specifically on these aspects of claims. Part of the expense
of the legal system owes to its formality, as well as to regulations requiring law
degrees and bar admissions for lawyers. Of course, there are benefits to such
formality, and an ultimate question in assessing blockchain-based insurance is
whether a sufficiently strong adjudication system can be designed without these
formal processes. Perhaps the arbitration process as described as above will not be
sufficient, but a virtue of private ordering is that aspects of the system that prove
problematic can be improved upon, without the necessity for revolutions in civil
procedure. For example, if a perception develops that there is too much fraud, then
smart contracts might provide for benefits to whistleblowers who identify such
fraud.
Similarly, if the adjudicative process is too open-ended, the system can rely
more on underwriting. Yet, there are strong reasons to believe that a system of smart
contracts will rely more on standards than on rules. This may seem counterintuitive;
it might seem that a mechanical system like a smart contract necessarily will require
unambiguous rules. But that is impossible. Any contract that relies not just on code
but also on human language to refer to events in the real world, as any insurance
contract must, will necessarily require the exercise of judgment. We might tolerate
a greater degree of subjectivity with smart contracts so long as arbitrators have
incentives to make decisions as other arbitrators would, rather than according to
their whim or political preference, and the appellate process can provide such
incentives.
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One reason that insurance contracts are relatively rule-like is that rules
provide protection against legal decisionmaker biases. Sometimes, these biases
may be essentially random, with some judges biased in favor of insurance
companies and some biased in favor of insureds. But most bias will be of the latter
type. This is true for two reasons. First, the doctrine of contra proferentum provides
that ambiguous policy provisions will be interpreted against the insurance
company.36 Second, juries may have a natural bias to favor insureds, especially
when the insureds are individuals.37 Collectively, these two pressures will push
insurance companies in the direction of using clear rules, rather than relying on
standards. Rules are inevitably overinclusive and underinclusive, and this may lead
the companies to adopt inefficient contracts, relative to those they would adopt in
a world in which they did not expect bias in adjudication.
Of course, it is possible that arbitrators may have their own biases, but
individual monetary incentives seem likely to go a long way toward providing
fairness incentives. Moreover, with an insurance pool, if arbitrators are
systematically biased, that will have little effect. If, for example, every insured
receives a valuation 20% higher than it should be, then all claimants will still
receive the same amount of money as if this did not occur, since payouts are
proportional to verified claims. Some bias might still inhere in the initial question
of whether a covered loss occurred at all, and fraudulent or generous claims will
come at the expense of other policyholders making claims. But if the problem is
serious, providers of smart contracts might choose different arbitrators who they
are confident will not too easily allow weakly supported claims.
3. Regulation
Perhaps the greatest market opportunities for unregulated insurance will
arise where regulations cause market distortions. For example, laws may prevent
insurers from taking into account applicants’ genetic data in pricing coverage. 38
Should widespread whole genome testing become available, these laws threaten to
create adverse selection problems, as individuals with greater susceptibility to
health problems may be most likely to purchase health and life insurance. 39 If this
occurs, there will be a market opportunity to sell unregulated insurance to
individuals lucky enough to have genes that make them lower risk. As discussed
below, there may be challenges to offering unregulated blockchain insurance, but
36
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assuming that such insurance can exist, the market would be able to avoid
regulations that cross-subsidize those with less healthy genes. My argument here is
positive not normative; there are strong arguments for preventing genetic
discrimination,40 and perhaps even stronger ones for preventing race discrimination
in insurance.41 The point is simply that if the law prevents efficient contracting
between insureds and insurers, that provides a competitive advantage to
blockchain-based insurers that avoid regulation.
Other forms of regulation may similarly create market opportunities.
Consider, for example, rate regulation. If rate regulation has the effect of cartelizing
the industry and raising prices, unregulated insurers may be able to undercut
existing prices. If, however, rate regulation tends to lower prices,42 that can lead to
supply shortages,43 and blockchain-based insurance may fill the void by offering
coverage. Meanwhile, coverage mandates can create opportunities for blockchainbased insurers. If all health insurance purchasers must provide maternity
coverage,44 then individuals who are confident that they will not need such coverage
may purchase cheaper insurance. Similarly, some states provide that policies shall
be incontestable after a certain period of time, meaning that false statements can no
longer invalidate the policy.45 If this is inefficient, either because it means that
honest policyholders are cross-subsidizing fraudsters or because it forces insurance
companies to spend funds in excessive ex ante monitoring of insureds, there may
again be a market opportunity for unregulated insurance.
The question, of course, is how great the market opportunities are. Insureds
presumably already could purchase offshore insurance and submit claims over
websites, yet such markets have not materialized as significant competitors to
traditionally provided insurance. This may, however, be in part because insureds
might not fully trust offshore insurers, a problem that smart contracts may address.
Meanwhile, if smart contract-based insurance is administratively cheaper than
traditional insurance, that provides further market opportunities.
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B. Legal Challenges
1. Legality
While legal regulation of insurance may create market opportunities for
unregulated insurance, the possibility that lawmakers will seek to regulate
unregulated insurance creates an obvious obstacle. The challenge is that if
insurance is sold entirely through a cryptocurrency, it may be difficult to regulate.
The government, however, may still have several possible approaches to blocking
unregulated insurance.
First, the government might seek to regulate purchasers of insurance
directly. Such regulation could be quite effective, particularly because the most
obvious implementations of blockchain-based insurance require that insurance
policies be stored transparently on the blockchain. The question is whether
governments are willing to target consumers of insurance, rather than producers. If
the government did decide to target consumers, the question then becomes whether
such insurance might continue to exist without requiring consumers to identify
themselves. Plausibly, information could be stored in encrypted form, but at least
the arbitrator will need to be able to read an unencrypted version of the policy in
determining whether to pay out claims. Conceivably, the government could pose as
arbitrators to perform a sting operation against those filing insurance claims. Even
less extreme action, however, could undermine aspects of the use case for
blockchain by making it less transparent.
Second, the government might seek to ban the underlying cryptocurrency.
China has aggressively cracked down on Bitcoin,46 illustrating that a regulatory ban
is at least possible. But such a crackdown is far easier in a country in which the
Internet is pervasively regulated. It seems unlikely that the United States or
European countries would enact Internet filtering to prevent consumers from
contacting insurance sites. More plausibly, the government might regulate financial
exchange transactions into and out of a cryptocurrency. Blockchain-based
insurance could be considerably hampered if it were impossible to use a credit card
or a bank account to purchase (or receive the sale proceeds of) cryptocurrency. 47 It
will be difficult, however, for government officials to eradicate black markets,
which might also be used for other troubling uses of cryptocurrency, such as paying
extortion demands from ransomware developers. The question is whether
government regulation adds enough hassle to cryptocurrency transactions to make
blockchain-based insurance infeasible. At this point, the government has shown
little interest in banning Bitcoin or Ethereum, and it may be impractical for the
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government to add regulatory controls once the public depends on these
cryptocurrencies.
2. Legal Requirements
The legal system, however, may be able to thwart the development of
particular blockchain-based insurance markets by requiring individuals to purchase
legally regulated insurance. For example, drivers are generally required to purchase
automobile insurance,48 and unregulated blockchain-based insurance presumably
would not qualify. That does not necessarily entirely eliminate the possibility of
blockchain-based insurance for additional coverage above and beyond that
provided by insurance companies, such as for optional collision coverage.
Meanwhile, to the extent that the law provides tax breaks for insurance, thus
subsidizing legally recognized insurance, blockchain-based insurance will be at a
considerable disadvantage. For example, life insurance proceeds are generally
excludable from gross income under the Internal Revenue Code.49 Any uncertainty
about whether such income would be excludable would likely doom that form of
blockchain-based insurance, at least unless beneficiaries of such policies evade
their tax liabilities, for example by disguising their receipt of life insurance
proceeds.
3. Legal Support for Blockchain-Based Insurance
It is not inevitable that the legal system will treat blockchain-based
insurance disadvantageously. Existing insurance companies have rents to protect
and can thus be expected to lobby to cement their existing advantages and
disadvantage blockchain-based insurance. But such efforts are not always
successful. Taxicab companies, for example, have been mostly ineffective in
countering ride-sharing services such as Uber, which have greatly reduced the value
of medallion licenses.50 Blockchain-based insurance could follow a similar path, in
which customers purchase policies when their legal status remains uncertain but
then provide pressure on legislators to allow such insurance.
If for these or other reasons, a legislature wanted to promote blockchainbased insurance, how might it do so? First, the law might explicitly allow such
insurance and provide that blockchain-based insurance contracts are unenforceable
in court. This would ensure continued evolution and competition in the design of
arbitral mechanisms. Second, the law might allow for courts to be used to enforce
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promises that cannot be enforced by smart contracts alone, such as promises to use
property recognized by the traditional legal system as security for blockchain-based
insurance contracts. Third, if some degree of regulation is to be retained, these
regulations should be tailored to blockchain-based insurance, recognizing that there
may be no insurance company associated with any particular smart contract to
regulate. Thus, regulation should directly affect insureds, for example by providing
penalties should insureds release types of information that should be irrelevant to
insurance pricing, such as genetic information. Fourth, and most radically, a
legislature might create a fiat cryptocurrency, denominated in the same currency
unit as the main currency. A legal commitment that the government will exchange
cryptocurrency units for dollars or other internationally recognized currency would
reduce the risk associated with the volatility of the cryptocurrency itself. This could
facilitate blockchain-based insurance not only in that country, but also elsewhere.
The absence of these forms of support could make it much more challenging for
blockchain-based insurance to emerge.
IV. CONCLUSION

The skeptical perspective on blockchain-based insurance is that the
blockchain merely facilitates transactions that easily can be performed without the
blockchain and indeed that were performed at relatively low transactions costs
without the Internet. The bullish case for blockchain-based insurance highlights the
possibility that such insurance could exist largely separate from the legal system,
freeing it both of burdens associated with regulation by the administrative state and
the expense associated with traditional adjudication in courts. This would require
development of software code and accompanying contracts that insureds will trust,
and such trust would likely come only with time. In the long run, however, it is
plausible that more informal adjudicative structures could be cheaper and thus
allow for more efficient, cheaper insurance contracts. Blockchain-based insurance
also might be more transparent and trustworthy than traditional insurance, perhaps
making it easier for consumers to determine which insurance is most appropriate
for their needs. The legal system poses challenges for blockchain-based insurance
as well. There is both the danger that the legal system might effectively ban such
insurance and the possibility that even if blockchain-based insurance avoids
regulation, the absence of the legal system will cause inefficiencies, for example by
preventing the effective investment of premiums. Finally, if blockchain-based
insurance does prosper, that might provide economic efficiency but at the expense
of other goals of the legal system, such as ensuring that certain factors not be taken
into account in insurance pricing.

